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Abstract Starting from two accounts of psychological change in therapeutic
settings, based respectively on the analysis of metaphors (Faccio et al. 2011, this
issue) and on transformative moments in self narratives (Ribeiro and Gonçalves
2011, this issue), this paper examines core processes of psychological change.
Drawing on sociocultural psychology, the paper first argues that core processes of
change in such therapeutic settings take place at the level of the organization of a
person’s semiotic sets. Second, the paper suggests that such therapeutic frames are
likely to provoke changes in other aspects of a person’s life as these aim at
transforming the persons thinking capacities, and as these have as objects situations
external to them.
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psychology . Spheres of experience
Introduction
In their paper, Ribeiro and Gonçalves (2011, this issue) propose to see “therapy as a
natural laboratory where often changes occur at a faster pace” (p. xx). These authors,
as well as Faccio et al. (2011, this issue), try to describe psychological change
through an analysis of the evolution of verbal occurrences within the therapeutic
setting: the firsts authors study the evolution of self-narratives, the second, the
evolution of metaphors used by patients. Both see these changes in linguistic form
and structure as signals, and means, of psychological change. Why is that? Or, more
precisely, if we admit both demonstrations, how can we explain that changes in
metaphors and self-narratives might both be attached to psychological change? And
secondly, why would be changes in interactions with a psychologist, within the
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specific setting of therapy, have any consequence at all in the life of the person
outside of that setting? In order to answer to these two questions, I will replace the
process of psychotherapy in a broader developmental perspective: this will enable
me to propose one tentative model of semiotic elaboration in mind, and of the
articulation between spheres of experiences in one’s daily life.
Semiotic Processes and Therapeutic Change
Metaphors and Self-Narratives in Therapy
For Faccio et al. (2011, p. xx) “the essence of metaphor is to understand and
experience one thing in terms of another [and thus] metaphor organizes each
person’s own perception of the world, influencing as well his/her way of
experiencing it”. Hence a metaphor enables to capture feelings in spatial terms—
certain mood is thus called “depressed”, which suggests feeling “low”, in opposition
to feeling “high”. Yet metaphors have acquired stable meanings in a certain shared,
or personal culture (Valsiner 1998) (what the author calls “language game”). Thus a
spatial metaphor might carry all kinds of associations and connotations on the
metaphorical plane, that have recursively consequences on the literal, initial
experience. If one feels “very low” it will need a lot of effort to “cheer up” again.
In some cases, the metaphor might even be “literalized”—a “heavy moral burden”
might be felt as heavy and bring a person to actual back pain. Faccio et al. present
the case study of a woman who feels as a problem the fact that she is “tall”; her
“literalization” brings a whole semantic network associated to “height” to permeate
her daily life; she permanently measures her height to others’, or she limits her
relationship to her daughter to comments about her posture (she should “straighten
up”). As a result, she can not really communicate with her daughter or engage with
others—she is prisoner of the ramifications of the metaphor. Therapy, in that case, is
presented as likely to reinstall new “language games”—by breaking down these self-
imposing semantic network, or opening new associations.
Pereira and Gonçalves (2011, this issue) are also sensitive to the way in which people
talk about themselves. They consider “self-narratives” constructed around various I-
positions, which might be more or less in tension or contradictory with each other.
Therapy might lead the person to move from problematic self-narratives to new ones,
and the authors have developed a complex analytical grid to follow the transformation
of self-narratives. They thus have identified typical sequences in transformative
processes: “innovative moments”—moments in which a new self-narrative might
emerge; and what follows—whether there is quick return to the initial problem, or
whether it might bring to a stabilized new change. The case study of a young woman
experiencing various difficulties exemplifies their argument. As she initially presents
herself as a negativistic person, who does not trust much herself, feels unease, etc., the
authors identify a “pessimistic” self-narrative. They then observe the emergence of a
counter self-narrative of “optimism” when the young woman observes that “she was
always able to reach her goal”, or “get what she wants”. The therapist’s action aims at
catalyzing the “non-pessimistic” narrative; after some oscillation between statements
considered as “pessimistic” and “optimistic”, and highlighted explicitly by the therapist,
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the young woman names the need to find a sort of “balance”. “Balance” becomes
another self-narrative identified by the authors.
The two papers suggest that various aspects of our discourse can be seen as
belonging to a wider whole, whose consistency exists beyond the simple occurrence
and the individual person. Hence, talking about one’s size and one’s daughter’s
posture belong to the same socially shared and idiosyncratic idea of “tallness”.
“Managing one’s goals” or “getting one’s goal” both suggest that a person’s
narration reflects a more general common notion of “optimism”. The two papers also
suggest that these “wider wholes” have some power on a person’s life—or
minimally, that they guide the way in which a person perceive herself, and how
she acts and interacts. What is that common principle on which the two papers base
their descriptions? How can we account for the fact than words, metaphor or
semantic fields can change one’s feelings or limits one’s action? What is the
common therapeutic aim?
Both papers choose to focus their analysis at the level of words—language games,
or narratives. But the “performativity” and the “guidance” of words comes from a
more general characteristic: metaphors, words for emotions etc. are of semantic kind,
and as thus, behave like signs. Hence I propose to consider signs as they small
common denominator of these papers, and my commentary will focus at the level of
semiotic processes.
A Semiotic Perspective on Development
Semiotic sociocultural psychology admits that human experience is given to them
through signs (Salvatore and Zittoun 2011; Valsiner 1998, 2007; Zittoun 2006)—things
that stand for something else, for someone and under some aspect (for instance Peirce
1878). A sign can be a mnemonic trace of a past experience; but it can be also
anything that has a socially acknowledged sign value (a red light, a triangle, a word or
a color). Some signs exist out there in our environment, and as we interact with them,
they are internalized—they find some form of translation in our mind (Valsiner 1998).
There, they enter in complex processes of organization and differentiation and
hierarchization, that have been described widely, under various labels.
Drawing on Vygotsky’ (1986) idea of “quasi concept”, we might say that
ontogenetically children start experiencing and remembering situations as wholes—
such as the whole “nice-feeling situation when mother offers me milk and sings me a
song”. Eventually, some aspect of such a whole might become a sign for the whole—
as when it becomes “milk time”. Appropriate language and concept uses emerge when
children start to be able to discriminate, within that situation, things which are socially
constructed and designated as such. Hence, the word “milk” does not mean “mother
feeding me and singing”, but only the white liquid in the bottle. With time, the
experience might on the one side be associated with the idiosyncratic group of “nice
moments with mother”, which differ from “not nice moments with her”, and on the
other side, be recognizable with the socially shared label of “milk”, which can be
classified as “liquid” or even as more abstract category of “milk product”, in
opposition to “vegetal products”.
Similarly, as adults, we keep apprehending situations both as wholes, which
resemble or differ from aspects of earlier experience, and at the same time, through
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the analytical grid of shared words, categories, and hierarchically organized notions.
Yet it is not only verbal or socially instituted notions that are organized. This first
mode of organization, which leads to what we might call “semiotic sets” (Zittoun et
al. 2011)—signs which are associated in mind under some aspect—can also be
organized and structured: in our daily experiences, we also distinguish events or
things from their opposite; we also group them, and through processes of synthesis,
hierarchize these groups; and we can use some of them to think about others—hence
when the experience of seeing a tree in the wind becomes a mean to reflect upon
one’s emotional state (as can be expressed in poetry).
My hypothesis is thus that people experience the world and think through
different modes of organizing experiences in semiotic sets—modes which often
coexist, and which are more or less socially shared. Hence, the daily situation of
“drinking coffee with neighbor” can be, for the same person, through some link of
emotional similarity, associated with “drinking milk with mother”; through social
learning, with “occasion to establish good relationship with neighborhood”; or, if
required, can be associated to the consensually shared semantic network of “tea-
drinking”; “informal meeting”; etc. In other words, semiotic sets can be elaborated
through logics of recurrence (i.e., repetitive experiences become a set), through
strong emotional impact (i.e., elements of a semiotic set are glued by strong
emotions, as in flashbulb memories), or through different modes of social guidance—
such as when learning a specific scientific language to organize a field of knowledge, or
when constructing a set that corresponds to a social representation anchored in one’s
social group (what is a “proper woman”, Zittoun et al. 2011).
All semiotic means have potentially the same power to both fix experience, and
distance from it; they are markers of the stream of consciousness. In a series of
studies pursuing classical studies on emotions, Valsiner (2005; 2011) has thus shown
that semiotic means can help to identify a given physical/perceptual/emotional state
(level 1 in Fig. 1 below); than more generalized ones enable to label such situations
(level 2), or even to identify it as part of a category or group (level 3); and that
eventually, that semiotic mean can be hyper-generalized into a meaning field (level
4), such as a general feeling of optimism or helplessness.
Semiotic Processes and Psychotherapeutic Change
All forms of psychotherapy invite people to use semiotic means to “express” their
experience (through drawing, acting, singing or speaking)—but doing so, they also
suggest transforming it.
Specifically, in the two forms of therapy described in this issue, language is meant
to capture emotional, embodied states. In the first case, the woman describes her
feeling of inadequacy with the word “being tall” (level 2); in the second case, the
young woman consults for a feeling of discomfort which she describes as “not
trusting” herself (level 2). In both cases, the local externalization of the patient
are interpreted by therapist as revealing some underpinning “order”, or
“category”, that makes hold together a certain number of experiences—which
we might call “semiotic sets”. In one case, the therapist makes the hypothesis
that the mode of grouping various experiences is socially constructed: it is
because “tall” is associated to a whole semantic set, mobilized by the patient,
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that the patient is prisoner of the “tallness metaphor” (level 3). In the other case,
the therapist proposes a name to label a group of experience “pessimistic”,
“balanced”—thus proposing some distance over the corresponding experiences
(level 3). The working hypothesis of the therapist seems thus to be that it is the
particular grouping of experience which has some stability, and forces the person
to interpret further experiences or define conduct under the umbrella of that
particular semiotic set. And in both cases, the therapist seems to suggest a
transformation of the set, either by re-labeling it, or by adding events or
experiences normally not included within the set, so as to eventually change its
extension and content. Hence, if what prevents the patient to experience some
type of feeling or engage is new conducts is their limiting “labeling” (at level 2),
therapy proposes to transform semiotic processes at a different level of distancing
(at level 3), which brings about new possible experiences at level 1, and might
subsequently alter the general mood of the person—her feeling of hopelessness
or of depression (level 4).
The Therapeutic Frame
The second question to be asked is why such processes of labeling or reorganization
of semiotic sets within the setting of a psychotherapeutic encounter might have any
influence on one’s person capacities to deal with situations beyond that particular
setting. To explain this two points have to be explored.
Continuity and Change Through Spheres of Experiences
First, from a person’s perspective, “going to the therapist” is just one of the many things
he or she does in her daily life, and during a limited period of time. “Going to the
therapist” belong to one sphere of experience—a social frame phenomenologically
experienced as distinct from others—which is one of the many spheres experienced by
the same person, next to being home, being at work engaged in team work, or alone on
one’s desk, or at the movies (Zittoun 2011)… In each sphere of experience, the person
is engaged in conducts that imply interactions with real or imagined others, that are
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Fig. 1 Levels of semiotic mediation, from Valsiner 2011
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mediated by specific means, and demand feeling, thinking, communicating, doing
things, etc. In each sphere of experience, the person is engaged in activities which
participate to her daily change: a new task has been achieved at work, and she feels
happy and more confident; at sports after work, the person might have tried to learn a
new trick at tennis and have been beaten by a friend; back at home, the person might
then see a movie which brings her back to some uncomfortable childhood experience.
To some extend, people’s experiences in these many spheres of experience are cut off
from another; hence, feeling a bad tennis player after the match usually does not make
the person feel incompetent at work. Indeed, self-definition, or I-position in Pereira
and Gonçalves’ term, are also situation-specific: they are attached to certain activities,
the skills and actions they demand, the specific and local sense it has for a person, in
relationship with others. Of course, and this is a recurrent difficulty in psychology, as
people migrate through spheres of experiences, they remain also the same person, and
they normally maintain a sense of self-continuity.
Besides the fact that it is physically the same person that goes through these
spheres, two other dimensions can be invoked when it comes to explain continuity
through change. One is given by the constant dialogicality of social life and human
experience: for various reasons, situation call upon other ones, the language used in
one sphere carries the echoes of other spheres, objects and things demand
interactions in different spheres of experiences, etc. (Grossen 2010; Grossen and
Salazar Orvig 2011). The second dimension is given by the very modalities of
human sense-making. Indeed, as the local demands of the person’s situation change,
her own capacities to adjust to them also evolve generally relatively slowly—unless
the person experiences a major rupture. In effect, hyper-generalized feelings, which
result from the slow, and constant parallel generalization of experience, might color
one’s experience durably: one’s generalized feeling that “the worst is still to come”
(or pessimism), might be present at work, in private life or in expected events. Or
one’s organization of idiosyncratic categories, based upon emotional and recurrent
experiences, might have some stability too. Yet, at the same time, these modes of
organizing experiences can be changed—through slow accumulation of changes or
through ruptures (as described by dynamics system approach, see Fogel 2006). In
that sense, the therapeutic setting, as proposed above, can be seen as providing one
of the many spheres of experiences in which change occurs. But how to be certain
that changes occurring within that setting last beyond its boundaries?
The Therapeutic Sphere of Experience
The therapeutic setting has a few specificities, described by clinicians
themselves as well as social psychologists (Grossen and Perret-Clermont
1992). First, it usually takes place in specific institutional contexts that legitimize
this type of interactions for psychological change. Their material setting is also
usually arranged so as to foster change: the place is isolated, silent, chairs or sofas
are disposed according to certain theories, therapists dispose of conceptual tools,
professional validation, and past experiences of understanding themselves and
others, etc. When a new patient comes in, an interactive frame has to be created—
which usually implies for therapist and patient to collaboratively define what the
demand is, what the goal of the therapy might be, and how to achieve it. One of
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the expertise of most therapists is precisely to bring to a good enough therapeutic
frame, or alliance, in which both person are oriented towards the solution of a
problem through certain means.
How the change if going to be brought about depends on the therapist’s preferred
or acquired theories. In the psychoanalytical setting, for example, change can be
described as being enabled by the very fact that the setting could be seen as an
amplification of the mind. In effect, in that frame, a patient addresses a stream of
words (“free associations”) to some invisible other, stream which might be more or
less saturated with emotions, full of inconsistencies, recurrences, discourse about
what is and what could be, and also, absences. This stream of consciousness can be
addressed to that other, because there is a strong emotional relationship between
patient and analyst—transference—partly fed by reactualizations of earlier relation-
ships. The flow of language—which can be very close to affects—enables a first
capture and distance from embodied affects or unsemiotized experiences. Second, it
is the work of the analyst to slowly identify, thanks through “floating attention”,
some order in that flow: interpretations—supported by theory—can be seen as
suggestions on how various experiences are grouped, as attempt to identify possible
sets, to create links where there are none, or to highlight some sorts of grouping which
are cause of pain or distress, and especially, identify forms of association which are
repetitive and prevent change (for instance Green 2005). In other words, the therapeutic
setting can be seen as a socially implemented system for thinking which otherwise
could occur in the mind of a person: it is a “talking apparatus” meant to render visible,
externalize, and socially share, the “psychic apparatus”. This externalization is thus
meant to reinforce the person in her ability to think about her own experience in her
mind: the intersubjective relation is dynamic thanks to the transformation of two sets
of intrapsychological processes (Green 2002). In vygotskian terms, it can be described
as a social situation that should bring to the creation, on a mental plane, of similar
dialogical processes, thus reinforcing thinking processes. Although they do not rely on
psychoanalysis, the two variations of therapeutic setting described by Faccio et al.
(2011, this issue), and Pereira and Gonçalves (2011, this issue) might similarly be seen
as setting enabling to display, on a social level, processes of thinking, which could
otherwise be occurring within the mind of the person.
Therapy: Developing Thinking About Other Spheres
From such a description, two consequences can be deduced: first, although the
therapeutic interaction usually has as objects of discourse situations and events
occurring in other spheres of experience, its goal is not to solve the actual problem
where it lays: it is generally to bring about a change in the very way in which the person
mentally apprehends these past events, so as to increase her future possible actions or
understanding. Second, consequently, it also suggest that the change operated is located
at the level of the person’s thinking processes, that is, that it affects how her semiotic
sets, categories, or semiotic means of different levels, are organized. Hence, therapy can
be seen as a sort of learning-teaching situation in which pain-causing, or development-
preventing modes of thinking are diagnosed and transformed.
In other words, therapy might durably change the person in various spheres of
experiences, first precisely because it is about learning to think about situations in
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other spheres of experiences; and second, because it is about developing modes of
thinking about these past and present experiences which enable further changes and
avoid repetition.
To better highlight the specificity of the therapeutic process, we can compare
therapy with other spheres of experience in which experts intend to change durably a
person. On the one side, school settings usually aim at changing the thinking
capacities of the learning person; but unlike therapy, the objects of discourse of
educational settings are usually very specific to that setting (nowhere else as at
school one usually meets algebra and grammatical analysis). On the other hand,
daily conversations—such as discussions between acquaintances, or pub talks, are
very often about other spheres of experiences—what happens at home or at work.
However, one might think that such conversation have very often a conservative
function: people tend to reinforce and stabilize their shared understanding of events
or their environment, especially if there are strong available social representations
active to guide their discourse (hence, problems with one’s boss might be repeatedly
described as due to the fact that bosses always want to exploit their women worker,
preventing the emergence of new modes of action). In contrast, thus, therapy
demands dialogues, whose objects are other spheres of experiences, and whose goal
is to produce new, durably evolving modes of thinking.
Therapy as Serious Play
In this paper, I have tried to take seriously the idea that therapy is a “laboratory for
change”—that is, that it creates a specific environment in which thinking processes
are isolated and, ideally, catalyzed. Considering two different therapeutic settings, I
have addressed two questions: What is the smaller common denominator shared by
various forms of therapy based on a verbal interaction between two persons? And
how can we explain that change eventually achieved within the specific frame of the
therapeutic interaction might have any consequences outside of that frame, in an
other of the person’s many spheres of experiences?
In order to answer these questions I proposed a wider sociocultural, develop-
mental approach, in which the core processes of psychological change might be seen
as taking place in the person’s ability to organize her experience under semiotic
forms. From such a perspective, therapy is one of the many spheres of experiences in
which change and possibly development might occur. The specificities of that sphere
is that it is strongly socially organized and oriented toward change; and the actual
interaction have as object events beyond the sphere, about which the person is
progressively encouraged to think differently, so as to reorganize her own modes of
understanding.
Yet there is something more to therapy as a laboratory. As laboratory, it is indeed
a protected space: the therapeutic alliance is based on the promise made by the
therapist not to mention that therapy and its content to other persons. In that frame,
as we have seen, patient and therapist try to deconstruct the simple one-to-one
correspondence between events and their meaning, acts and their emotional valence,
metaphorical and literal sense, or even, words and their meaning and connotation.
Therapy can be thus seen as an attempt to introduce some game zone within the
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usual links between words and things. It thus might be seen as starting when people
question the taken-for-granted of that what is, so as to open the possibility of
thinking what if: what if the patient would stop behaving like a good person, what if
she would let her anger go free? It can also be seen as an exploration of the
consequences of these thoughts (what could be), and of identification of the more
general rules that prevents the person to engage in these hypothetic exploration
(what should not be) (see Valsiner 1998; Zittoun et al. 2011).
It is in these terms that Winnicott (2001) has described the therapeutic sphere as
“transitional space”—as space in which things, sentences and actions are both real—
about the socially shared world, about real people—and not real—where one can
experience events and fantasies that have no rights to be elsewhere; and a space in
which the first goal of the therapist is to restore the person’s ability to play. In that
sense, therapy might be seen as a laboratory for change because it is a playful zone,
where things from various spheres of experiences might be freely and playfully
questioned and imagined differently, and where even the boundaries between
spheres of experience might be questioned and overlooked. Imagining new possible
meanings, new views of the world and new boundaries—creating new semiotic
forms—is the first step for making them actual.
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